中国は爆発的に危険な状態

ベックワース氏のエントリから。
Macro Musings Blog: China's Coming Devaluation: Another Consequence of the Fed's Mistake of 2015
ここで言われている「爆発的な危機」の予想があたってしまうと、２０１６年、２０１７年は日本政府、日銀も一層の経済対策を迫られることになります。今から策を考えていて欲しいと思います。
中国が爆発すると、世界同時デフレ=大恐慌、になるんでしょうか。

China's Coming Devaluation: Another Consequence of the Fed's Mistake of 2015
I recently argued that the Fed did not make a mistake in December 2015 by raising interest rates. Rather, it made a mistake by talking up interest rate hikes the year and a half leading up to December 2015. This signalling that future monetary policy would be tightened got priced into the market and affected decisions well before the December rate hike. In so doing, the Fed got ahead of the recovery and helped precipitate a slowdown in U.S. economic activity in the second half of 2015.
ＦＥＤの利上げ予告は、まだ回復していないアメリカ経済をスローダウンさせた。

That is the domestic side of this story. There is also an international side that I want to revisit here. Specifically, the Fed's tightening leading up to December 2015 catalyzed two important developments in the global economy: the reversal of capital flows to emerging markets and the turning of the Chinese economy into an explosive tinder box.
グローバルにみると、ＦＥＤの利上げは新興国からの資本移動を引き起こし、中国経済を危険地域に変えた。

Consider first the reversal of capital flows from emerging markets. According to the International Institute of Finance, emerging markets in 2015 experienced net capital outflows for the first time in almost three decades. They saw approximately $735 billion in net capital outflows in 2015, of which about $637 billion came from China. So to explain the sudden reversal of capital flows from emerging markets, one really has to explain what happened in China.
２０１５年に新興国から移動した資本はここ３０年で最大であった。新興国から移動した７３５０億ドルのうち、６３７０億ドルは中国からのものであった。

One striking manifestation of China's capital outflow is the decline in China's foreign reserves. They peaked in June 2014 near $4 trillion and since then has declined almost $663 billion. Currently, Chinese monetary authorities are burning through about $100 billion of reserves a month. This dramatic turn can be seen below:
この資本移動は、中国の外貨準備を減少させた。現在中国当局は、月に１０００億ドルの外貨準備を減らしている。

So what is driving this capital outflow from China? My contention is that the tightening of monetary policy caused by the Fed talking up of interest rates hikes was behind this outflow. This next figure supports this understanding. It shows how the growth of Chinese foreign reserves appear to be tied to changes in the stance of U.S. monetary policy.
ＦＥＤの利上げがこの背後にあるというのが筆者の考えだ。中国の外貨準備が、アメリカの金融政策と結びついているようであることが、リンク先の図から分かる。

The answer is twofold. First, China's currency has been tied to the dollar and through this link Fed policy gets transmitted to China. Fed policy via the dollar, therefore, is an important determinant of Chinese nominal demand and economic activity. To be clear, the Yuan-Dollar link has not always been constant, but it has been steady enough to make Fed policy felt in China. This link can be seen below:
この関連の答えは２つある。人民元はドルと連動しているので、ＦＥＤの金融政策は中国経済に影響する。

Given this connection, when the Fed started talking up interest rates in the second half of 2014 and continued doing so through 2015, not only did the dollar rise but so did the Yuan. Here is the rise of the dollar:
連動のため、ドルが上がると人民元も上がる。

This appreciation of the dollar pulled up the trade weighted value of the Yuan by approximately 15% between mid-2014 and mid-2015, implying a sharp tightening of monetary conditions in China during this time.
ドルの上昇は、２０１４年半ばから２０１５年半ばにかけて人民元の実質価値を１５％上昇させた。これは中国の金融が急激に引き締められたことを意味する。

This imported monetary tightening could not have come at a worse time for China. Its economic growth was already slowing down as it naturally transitions from a high-growth economy based on heavy industry and a large tradeable sector to low-growth one based more on consumption and a large service sector. In addition, there has been a debt boom in China that started with the large fiscal stimulus of 2008 and continues to this day.
この金融引き締めは、中国が高成長経済から低成長経済に自然と移行している時期に当たった。加えて、２００８年から今に至るまで多額の財政刺激を行っているため、債務が大量に発生している。

This debt boom in conjunction with a lack of reforms to state owned enterprises and other parts of the economy has made the Chinese economy more vulnerable to economic shocks. So between a natural slowdown and an increased susceptibility to shocks, the Chinese economy was not ready for the Fed's tightening of monetary policy as it talked up interest rate hikes.
この債務と、国営企業などの構造改革が進まないことが合わさって、中国経済は経済ショックを受けやすくなっている。

Chinese officials, however, were not going to go down without a fight. They tried to offset the effect of the Fed's tightening on the economy by easing domestic monetary conditions. This can be seen in the two charts below. They lowered the benchmark lending rate and the required reserve ratios for banks about the time the Fed started talking up interest rates.
しかし中国当局者は、ＦＥＤの影響による引き締めに、国内の金融を緩和することで対抗しようとしている。中国は短期貸出利率と所要準備率を引き下げた。

This response by Chinese officials is the second part of the answer for it created a tension. The easing of domestic monetary conditions puts downward pressure on the value of the Yuan, while the link to the dollar keeps it propped up. The fundamentals, in other words, are saying the Yuan needs to devalue while the exchange rate peg keeps it overvalued.
この対応が現在の緊張状態への２つめの答えだ。金融緩和は人民元に下落圧力を加える。一方で、ドルとの連動面では上昇している。言い換えると、為替ペッグが人民元を過大評価している一方で、経済の基礎的条件は人民元に減価を求めているということだ。

Investors, anticipating this tension cannot last forever, have been rapidly pulling their money out of China in anticipation of a devaluation. The only way to defend the elevated value on the Yuan, then, is to burn through foreign reserves. So while there are many moving parts here, the catalyst to the sudden reversal of capital flows seems to be the Fed's tightening of late 2014 - 2015.
投資家はこの緊張状態が永続しないと予期し、人民元の減価を予想して資金を急いで引き上げている。過大評価された人民元を防衛する唯一の手段は外貨準備を使用することである。

Consider now the turning of the Chinese economy into an explosive tinder box. To be clear, China's economy was already going to be a tinder box given the natural slowdown in economic growth and the rapid accumulation of debt. But the Fed's tightening turned it into an explosive one. The tightening of U.S. monetary policy has pushed China into corner where there are no good policy options.
中国経済はもともと、経済成長の鈍化と債務の堆積によって危険状態にさしかかっていた。しかし、ＦＥＤの利上げがそれを爆発的に危険な状態にしたのである。アメリカの利上げは中国を政策選択肢のないところに追い込んだのだ。

The tightening has significantly overvalued the Yuan, some say by 15% or more. And it does not appear likely the Fed will be easing (relative to other central banks) anytime soon. So China appears stuck with an overvalued currency at a time of economic stress in China. What can Chinese officials do?
中国は経済状態が悪いところに、通貨が過大評価されて行き詰まっている。ＦＥＤが近い将来に金融緩和する見込みはない。中国当局者はどうするか？

One option is that they could do a major devaluation of the Yuan. China, however, has a lot of external debt, including some $1 trillion in foreign debt owed by Chinese firms. So a devaluation would significantly raise its real debt burden. It could also create a huge deflationary drag on the global economy. We got a glimpse of the uncertainty a devaluation might create last August when China devalued a mere 2%. Imagine what happens when it falls 10% or more.
ひとつの選択肢は、人民元を減価することだ。しかし中国企業が抱える１兆ドルの対外債務を含め、中国は膨大な対外債務を抱えている。通貨の減価は債務の実質負担を著しく大きくしてしまう。それは世界経済にデフレ圧力を与えるであろう。昨年８月にたった２％の減価を人民元が行った際に引き起こされた不確実性を思えば、１０％かそれ以上の減価が何を引き起こすか想像してほしい。

A second option is simply to defend the peg by burning through the foreign reserves. If this path is chosen, however, it is likely to cause China to start burning through reserves at an accelerating rate. Investors, worried that at some point reserves will run out and force a devaluation, would intensify their run out of China. We are already seeing signs of this acceleration. China still has a large stash of foreign reserves, but it could wind down relatively fast.
ふたつめの選択肢は、外貨準備を使って通貨を防衛することである。しかしどの時点かで外貨準備が尽き、減価を強いられるようになると投資家は予想し、中国から一層逃げるだろう。中国の外貨準備は多額のように思えるが、それほどはもたない。

A final option is to tighten capital controls to prevent funds from fleeing China. There has been a growing chorus of supporters for this option. This option cannot end well either. As Eswar Prasad notes, tightening capital controls would only undermine confidence in China and hasten the capital flight.
みっつめの選択肢は資本規制を行い、中国から資本が移動することを妨げることである。この方法を勧める人が多いが、これも上手くはいかない。資本規制は中国への信認をこわし、資本逃避を加速させる。

It is also hard to believe Chinese officials could put up capital controls that could meaningfully stem the outflow of capital for one of the largest economies in the world. China is too big and its institutions too weak to make this work.
また、世界で最も大きな経済を持つ国の一つである中国にとって資本移動を防ぐために意味のあるような資本規制をすることが中国当局者にはできないだろう。中国は大きすぎ、その関係機関はこの作業をするには弱すぎる。

Finally, even if they could impose capital controls do we really think China would use this reprieve to do deep structural reforms to get it pass the crisis? I suspect it would only be kicking the can down the road and allowing more economic imbalances to grow.
結局、中国が資本規制をしても、危機を乗り越えるのに必要な構造改革ができないだろうから、経済をより不安定化させるだけだろう。

Put differently, the Fed's tightening has forced Chinese officials into trying the impossible trinity as there are no good alternative options. As the name implies, however, the impossible trinity is an unsustainable policy mix. Eventually something will give. Since capital controls are unlikely to work and since the stash of foreign reserves is finite, I believe China will be forced to do a major devaluation. It will not be pretty. And when it happens we can thank the Fed, in part, for bringing this about.
中国の資本規制は機能しないだろうし、外貨準備にも限りがあることを考えれば、人民元の減価を余儀なくされると筆者は考える。